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A RESPONSE TO 
PROFESSOR RUBENFELD 
Jonathan D. Hacker* 
Professor Jed Rubenfeld has offered in these pages1 an inge­
nious explanation for why the Supreme Court was right to strike 
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)2 in City of 
Boerne v. Flores.3 Rubenfeld finds in the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause a historical and inherent principle he calls 
"antidisestablishmentarianism": a prohibition on acts of Congress 
that "disestablish" religion in the several states. Rubenfeld reads 
the Establishment Clause as proscribing not only congressional acts 
that "establish" religion but also all congressional acts that "dictate 
a position on religion for states,"4 including laws designed to ensure 
that states abide by the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. 
RFRA was unconstitutional, Rubenfeld argues, because it trans­
gressed this principle. As the title of his Article suggests, 
Rubenfeld's explanation is so ingenious, in fact, that it did not even 
occur to the Justices who signed the Boerne majority opinion. 
In reasoning that Rubenfeld banishes to a footnote,5 the Court 
in Boerne modestly held that RFRA exceeded Congress's power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under Section 5 of that 
Amendment, because the RFRA's legislative scheme was not "con­
gruent" or "proportional" to the harm Congress identified in enact­
ing the law.6 Importantly, Boerne explicitly reaffirms Congress's 
long-recognized power under Section 5 to pass laws reasonably 
designed to remedy or deter state actions that violate the Constitu­
tion, even if such laws, in their operation, also prohibit actions that 
are themselves constitutionally permissible.7 
* Associate, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C. A.B. 1990, Harvard; J.D. 1995, University of 
Michigan. - Ed. I am extremely grateful for the helpful comments of Kristen Donoghue, 
Scott Idleman, and Michael Kent Curtis. 
1. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitu· 
tional, 95 MrCH. L. REv. 2347 {1997). 
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 141, 107 Stat. 1488 {1993). 
3. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
4. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2357. 
5. See id. at 2349 n.15. 
6. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164, 2171. 
7. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 {"Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional 
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it 
2129 
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The problem with RFRA, according to Boerne, was that it was 
not even targeted at unconstitutional state actions. The legislative 
record generated in support of RFRA was replete with instances in 
which seemingly neutral laws of general applicability imposed se­
vere "burdens" on religious practices.8 But in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,9 the Court had 
made clear that a state law of general applicability simply does not 
violate the First Amendment, no matter how significant its burden 
on the free exercise of religion, absent some evidence of discrimina­
tory motivation.10 To the Boerne Court, the extensive factual find­
ings underpinning RFRA - all concerning "burdens" on religious 
practice - failed to reveal any evidence at all of unconstitutional 
state actions as Smith defined them: 
It is difficult to maintain that [the state and municipal laws Congress 
identified in support of RFRA] are examples of legislation enacted or 
enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices 
or that they indicate some widespread pattern of religious discrimina­
tion in this country. Congress' concern was with the incidental bur­
dens imposed, not the object or purpose of the legislation.11 
Boerne does little more than confirm the lesson of Smith: burdens 
alone - even crushing, destructive burdens - are not enough to 
render a law affecting religious practices unconstitutional. 
Once the Court determined that the legislative record was es­
sentially devoid of examples of constitutional violations as the 
Court understood them,12 there was no hope for RFRA at all. Any 
congressional scheme to remedy or deter constitutional violations 
goes too far if there are no constitutional violations to remedy or 
deter.13 So of course RFRA lacked "proportionality" and "congru­
ence." That is all the Boerne Court really held. 
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of 
autonomy previously reserved to the States.'" (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 
(1976))). 
8. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. 
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
10. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
11. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. 
12. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171 {"Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and 
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion. In 
most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have been moti­
vated by religious bigotry."). 
13. What Congress needed to do was to build a legislative record demonstrating that state 
actions that appear to be neutral and generally applicable in fact frequently conceal official 
animus against religious practices. It may also be enough to show that government actors, 
when presented with evidence of severe burdens and a proposal for accommodation or ex­
emption, consistently refuse to yield. Because direct evidence of antireligious animus is un-
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Rubenfeld's story is much more dramatic. On the one hand, 
Boerne suggests that if Congress were able to build a record dem­
onstrating widespread state animus toward religious practices, and 
then passed a law requiring states to exempt religious exercisers 
from the reach of all generally applicable laws imposing an undue 
burden on such exercises, such a law would be well within 
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. 
Rubenfeld, on the other hand, is certain that such a law, and any 
law like it, would still be unconstitutional, because of the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause.14 
As Rubenfeld reads its text and enacting history, the Establish-
ment Clause 
does not only prohibit Congress from establishing religion; it prohibits 
Congress from dictating to the states how to legislate religion. The 
First Amendment excludes Congress from an entire legislative subject 
matter. Congress may not dictate a position on religion to individu­
als, and it may not dictate a position on religion to the states.15 
Tb.us RFRA's vice was not - as the Court concluded - that it was 
a response to a nonexistent constitutional problem, or that it was an 
overreaction to a minor constitutional problem; RFRA "really was 
unconstitutional" because the First Amendment specifically prohib­
its Congress from "disestablishing" religion in the several states. 
Not only was RFRA unconstitutional, but any congressional en­
actment designed to deter states from abridging the free exercise of 
religion - regardless of the evidence of state transgressions - vio­
lates the antidisestablishmentarian principle and therefore the Es­
tablishment Clause.16 According to Rubenfeld, laws that protect 
free exercise disestablish religion, and laws that disestablish religion 
offend the First Amendment. 
Or at least they offend Rubenfeld. I'm not so sure they offend 
the First Amendment. Not anymore. 
I want to suggest in this Correspondence that history has over­
taken, and nullified, Rubenfeld's interpretation of the Clause. Far 
from being "essential to the fundamental constitutional separation 
of religion and government,"17 as Rubenfeld claims it to be, in my 
likely to be forthcoming, see Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169, evidence of a kind of latent animus 
may be the best hope for supporters of a new RFRA. 
14. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2349. 
15. Id. at 2350. 
16. See id. at 2357 ("A disestablishmentarian law will characteristically vindicate toler­
ance and free exercise . . . . To the extent that states can constitutionally enact laws favoring 
one religion over others, Congress can make no law instructing them not to do so."); id. at 
2374. 
17. Id. at 2350. 
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view the antidisestablishmentarian principle today serves no consti­
tutional function whatsoever, and does not stand in the way of re­
sponsible congressional efforts to remedy or deter violations of the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
* * * 
Rubenfeld argues that antidisestablishmentarianism is part of 
the very core of the Establishment Clause. He offers a brief but 
fascinating history of the Founding period, which reveals to the his­
torically uninitiated the prevalence of established religions in and 
among the several states at the time. Rubenfeld acknowledges that 
there were "powerful antiestablishment" forces backing the First 
Amendment, who demanded the Establishment Clause as a guaran­
tee that Congress would not establish a national church.18 But 
Rubenfeld also points out that others were loudly voicing antidis­
establishment concerns. These members of the founding genera­
tion sought "to memorialize Congress's inability to 'interfere' or 
'intermeddle' with [state] religious establishments."19 In the end, 
the somewhat peculiar final wording of the Establishment Clause 
- the seemingly ambiguous proscription of congressional acts "re­
specting an establishment of religion"20 - was apparently a sop 
thrown to the New England states so that they could "insulate their 
states' local-establishment systems from federal attack."21 
From this history Rubenfeld draws the not unreasonable conclu­
sion that '"[r]especting' means 'with respect to' or 'regarding.' 
Congress can make no law concerning an establishment of reli­
gion. "22 And it follows from this, he says, that "Congress has no 
power to dictate a position on religion for individuals, and it has no 
power to dictate a position on religion for states. It has no power to 
dictate church-state relations at all - where 'state' refers to the 
governments of the several states."23 
* * * 
The logical connection between these points is not airtight, but 
the formulation makes at least some sense, as far as it goes. It goes 
18. Id. at 2354. 
19. Id. 
20. U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
21. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2355-56. 
22. Id. at 2356. 
23. See id. at 2377. 
June 1998] Response to Rubenfeld 2133 
no farther, however, than the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the sub­
sequent application of the Establishment Clause to the states,24 
formally eradicated the specific concerns underlying the original an­
tidisestablishmentarian aspects of the First Amendment: States no 
longer have religious establishments with any constitutional claim 
to protection from federal interference. State religious establish­
ments are gone - and with them, the very basis for the antidisest­
ablishmentarian principle. The rest of the Establishment Clause 
goes on with the hard work of prohibiting establishments, but 
what's left of antidisestablishmentarianism is a hollow idea, a prin­
ciple tilting at windmills.zs 
But the Fourteenth Amendment did more than prohibit state 
religious establishments; it also gave persons the right to be free 
from state interference in the free exercise of their religions.26 
When the original antidisestablishmentarian principle developed, 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment did not apply to 
the states.27 States could - and did - interfere with the free exer­
cise of religion whenever they wanted. The Fourteenth Amend­
ment changed all of that. The Amendment meant that, for the first 
time, the right to the free exercise of religion was a right protected 
against infringement by any of the several states. In this sense, the 
Fourteenth Amendment did no more or less with respect to the fed­
eral right of free religious exercise than it did with respect to other 
federal rights: it applied them as against the states and empowered 
Congress to enforce them by remedying or deterring violations.28 It 
is thus a perfectly straightforward interpretation of the Fourteenth 
24. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1963) ("The Fourteenth 
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact 
laws [respecting an establishment of religion]." (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 (1940))); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In fact, all formal state 
establishments were apparently eradicated well prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See SANFORD H. COBB, THE R.IsE OF REumous LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902). 
The incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment merely formalized a reality in the evolution of the concept of religious liberty in 
this nation that had taken place decades earlier. 
25. Justice Brennan once observed that antidisestablishmentarianism had "become his­
torical anachronism by 1868." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., concurring). See infra 
note 29. 
26. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
27. See, e.g., Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 
(1845) (explaining that a municipal law allegedly abridging free exercise of religion presents 
no cognizable federal constitutional question). 
28. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) ("The Civil Rights Act 
of 1871, along with the Fourteenth Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingre­
dients in the basic alteration of our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction 
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Amendment to conclude that Section 5 authorizes Congress to pass 
a law enforcing the right to free exercise, so long as it does so within 
the usual confines of its Section 5 powers.29 
Rubenfeld tries to defeat this logic by insisting on a special priv­
ilege for the antidisestablishmentarian principle in the hierarchy of 
federal rights. Rubenfeld argues that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
shift of power away from the states and toward the federal govern­
ment did not actually affect the antidisestablishmentarian principle 
because the principle is and always was about something much 
deeper than federal-state relations: 
[A]s I have tried to show throughout, the First Amendment's antidis­
establishmentarian component is not and never was merely a protec­
tion of federalism. It is not merely a states' rights or state sovereignty 
provision. First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism is a bul­
wark of religious freedom. It is a bulwark of the fundamental princi­
ple of separation ... between the national government and religious 
affairs.30 
Era. During that time, the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the 
basic federal rights of individuals against incursions by state power."). 
29. This analysis is consistent with the view articulated by Justice Brennan in Schempp. 
Responding to an earlier incarnation of the argument that an antidisestablishmentarian prin­
ciple survived and even trumped the Fourteenth Amendment - that incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment was "conceptually 
impossible because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose any at­
tempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state churches," Schempp, 374 U.S. at 
254 - Justice Brennan explained: 
Whether or not such was the understanding of the Framers and whether such a purpose 
would have inhibited the absorption of the Establishment Clause at the threshold of the 
Nineteenth Century are questions not dispositive of our present inquiry. For it is clear 
on the record of history that the last of the formal state establishments was dissolved 
more than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and thus the 
problem of protecting official state churches from federal encroachments could hardly 
have been any concern of those who framed the post-Civil War Amendments. Any such 
objective of the First Amendment, having become historical anachronism by 1868, can­
not be thought to have deterred the absorption of the Establishment Clause to any 
greater degree than it would, for example, have deterred the absorption of the Free 
Exercise Clause. That no organ of the Federal Government possessed in 1791 any 
power to restrain the interference of the States in religious matters is indisputable. It is 
equally plain, on the other hand, that the Fourteenth Amendment created a panoply of 
new federal rights for the protection of citizens of the various States. And among those 
rights was freedom from such state governmental involvement in the affairs of religion as 
the Establishment Clause had originally foreclosed on the part of Congress. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 254-55 (citations and footnotes omitted). Also included among the 
"panoply of new federal rights" was the freedom from state governmental interference in the 
free exercise of religion. And Congress's new power to enforce this right would surely trump 
the "historical anachronism" of antidisestablishmentarianism. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has also made the related point that the dramatic change in inter­
governmental powers since the founding era makes it impossible to tell how the original 
founders would view the meaning of the Establishment Clause today: "Because those who 
drafted and adopted the Frrst Amendment could not have foreseen either the growth of 
social welfare legislation or the incorporation of the Frrst Amendment into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we simply do not know how they would view the scope of the two Clauses." 
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722 {1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
30. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2375-76. 
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On this basis, Rubenfeld is able to assert that "[t]he erosion of state 
sovereignty effected by the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes no 
reason to erode the religious liberty protected by the First."31 In­
deed, Rubenfeld explains, it would actually be "profoundly per­
verse"32 to read the Fourteenth Amendment - which enhanced 
the separation of church and state by prohibiting state establish­
ments - in a way that would "cut back on a fundamental element 
of the constitutional separation between religion and 
government."33 
The problem with this argument is that it is simply not sup­
ported by the very historical evidence Rubenfeld reports at the out­
set of his article. The history he recites is quite specific: certain 
members of the founding generation were concerned about protect­
ing their state establishments and therefore insisted on the "re­
specting" language in the Establishment Clause. As Rubenfeld 
himself tells the story, the fight against disestablishment was a nar­
row, focused commitment to saving formal state establishments. It 
is wrong to say, as Rubenfeld does, that the antidisestablish­
mentarian principle was not "merely a protection of federalism" 
and "not merely a states' rights or state sovereignty provision." 
The history of the period shows that antidisest_ablishmentarianism 
became part of the First Amendment as a result of parochial Real­
politik and not a debate over the meaning and content of religious 
liberty. In short, antidisestablishmentarianism was only a "protec­
tion of federalism" and only a "states' rights or state sovereignty 
provision." 
Indeed, the Founders would have had no reason at all to think 
about antidisestablishmentarianism as the general inoculation 
against federal enforcement of free exercise that Rubenfeld makes 
it out to be. As noted earlier, at the time of the drafting and ratifi­
cation of the First Amendment, the individual federal right to be 
free from state abridgments of the free exercise of religion simply 
did not exist. Nor was there an obvious constitutional basis at the 
time for a congressional enactment enforcing this nonexistent right. 
Congressional interference with states' abridgments of free exercise 
assumes either a right to be protected - which did not exist - or 
congressional power to act - which probably did not exist - or 
both. Under these historical circumstances, the inference that the 
Founders saw in the Establishment Clause an abiding prophylactic 
31. Id. at 2376. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 2377. 
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against congressional enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause is 
unsupportable. 
History, then, reveals nothing "fundamental" at all about the 
antidisestablishmentarian principle - as Rubenfeld elucidates it -
to the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. There is therefore 
nothing especially "perverse" about interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment as empowering Congress to enforce the federal right 
against state abridgments of the free exercise of religion. 
Rubenfeld's interpretation of the Establishment Clause appears 
to suffer from a logical error that infects his view of the Clause's 
history and meaning. Rubenfeld's analysis strictly equates laws that 
deter free exercise violations with laws that interfere with state es­
tablishments of religions. Doctrinally, however, the two are not 
equivalent. A state action that infringes the federal right of free 
exercise does not necessarily establish state religion. Thus, a con­
gressional enactment designed to deter state actions that abridge 
the federal right of free exercise does not necessarily deter state 
establishments - or "disestablish" religion. 
Nor is the doctrinal disjunction between laws deterring free ex­
ercise violations and laws disestablishing religion merely an empty 
modem formalism. As I have attempted to show (on the basis of 
the evidence Rubenfeld has collected), the Founders were con­
cerned only about congressional laws disestablishing formal state 
religious institutions and practices; they had no reason at the time 
to anticipate congressional laws enforcing the Free Exercise Clause. 
Rubenfeld's view of the historical record overlooks this distinction: 
Some Americans of the founding era - including such towering 
figures as Jefferson and Madison - believed that all government 
should keep its hands, to the greatest extent possible, out of the do­
main of religion. Others believed, on the contrary, that state or local 
government had the authority to intercede directly in religious life. 
But both parties agreed that the national government should be kept 
out. Virtually everyone agreed that vesting Congress with a power to 
intermeddle in religious matters was a core evil to be avoided.34 
Once again, Rubenfeld seems to draw too much from the historical 
evidence he reports at the outset of the article. By his own account, 
the specific "evil" that "everyone" sought to avoid was nothing 
more than Congress's establishment of a national church or reli­
gion. And the "towering figures" of early American liberalism who 
sought to keep Congress out of the "domain of religion" intended 
only to keep Congress from establishing religion. Such a commit-
34. Id. at 2377 (footnotes omitted). 
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ment is not necessarily inconsistent with allowing Congress to make 
sure that states, too, keep out of the domain of religion - so long 
as such supervision does not amount to the kind of congressional 
act of establishment that was, in fact, universally reviled. 
In short, neither history nor logic compels the heavy reading of 
the Establishment Clause that Rubenfeld pursues.35 The most im­
portant point is that the story of congressional enforcement of the 
Free Exercise Clause was written by the Fourteenth Amendment 
generation, and that the original Founders had little or nothing to 
say about such matters. As with congressional enforcement of 
every other federal constitutional right, then, it is to basic Four­
teenth Amendment principles that one ought to tum - as the 
Boerne Court did - to interpret and adjudicate congressional ef­
forts to enforce the federal right to the free exercise of religion. 
But what of Rubenfeld's claim that giving full force and effect to 
the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the First would be tanta­
mount to "repealing" the Establishment Clause? To begin with, as 
I have argued, it certainly would not be "repealing" any aspect of 
the First Amendment that the Fourteenth Amendment did not al­
ready totally eviscerate by abolishing state establishments. More to 
the point, it also would not repeal any aspect of the text of the 
Clause. It is clear, of course, that the Establishment Clause has sur­
vived, and even prospered, since the Fourteenth Amendment re­
lieved the Clause of its antidisestablishmentarian baggage. The 
Amendment did not change the words of the Clause: it still says 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli­
gion." What the Fourteenth Amendment did was to change pro­
foundly the meaning of these words. As a result of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the same language that used to enjoin only Congress 
now enjoins state legislatures as well, and means at least that states, 
like Congress, cannot make laws "respecting an establishment of 
religion." If antidisestablishmentarianism were inherent in these 
35. Rubenfeld also proposes a couple of wild hypotheticals he says could constitutionally 
result unless we read the Establishment Clause his way. He warns that Congress might be 
allowed to enact a law forcing states to permit marriage between any persons or as many 
persons as they wish, or forcing states to ensure that parents expose their children to more 
than one religion. As to the first: if, in fact, Congress turned up extensive evidence that 
marriage laws were passed out of actual animus toward certain religions, then I suppose such 
a law would be constitutional under Boerne. Such a record would likely be impossible to 
generate, however, so antidisestablishmentarianism is not needed to save the day. And if it 
were true that hatred of minority religions was so pervasive that it motivated such co=on 
Jaws, then I would not be particularly troubled if Congress got involved to provide an anti­
dote to such venom. As to the second: such a law would blatantly violate the free exercise 
rights of nonconsenting adult parents, so (once again) the antidisestablishmentarian principle 
serves only to pile on. 
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words, the Establishment Clause would mean - in the wake of in­
corporation - that states could not disestablish their own state reli­
gions.36 The words of the Clause do not compel this ridiculous 
result, which demonstrates that the antidisestablishmentarian prin­
ciple is hardly inherent in the words of the Establishment Clause. 
Giving effect to the Fourteenth Amendment, then, in no way "re­
peals" the Establishment Clause. To the contrary, the text of the 
Clause continues to provide a meaningful and vital restraint on at­
tempts by Congress - and, after incorporation, the states and all 
other government actors - to establish religion. 
* * * 
For all of these reasons, then, I believe Rubenfeld is wrong to 
treat Congress's power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause via Sec­
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as dismissively as he does.37 
Any effort by Congress to enforce the Free Exercise Clause, he 
breezes, would disestablish religion, and anything that disestab­
lishes religion violates the Establishment Clause, and Congress can­
not do anything under Section 5 that violates another constitutional 
provision. But, as I have suggested, the Establishment Clause does 
not (and never really did) prohibit the free-exercise-enforcing laws 
Rubenfeld here labels disestablishments. These days the Clause 
prohibits establishments, and has nothing to say about whether 
Congress has the power under Section 5 to ensure that states obey 
36. In a slightly different context, Rubenfeld does contrive the argument that antidisest­
ablishmentarianism could apply to the states by, for example, precluding a state from passing 
a law that required parents to expose their children to more than one religion: 
Insofar as parents in essence establish a religion within the family, this statute could be 
seen as an attempt to disestablish religion within the sphere of parental authority. Just 
as the First Amendment bars Congress from dictating church-state relations, a Four­
teenth Amendment antidisestablishmentarian principle could bar states from dictating 
church-family relations. 
Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2379 n.124. Far from proving any aspect of Rubenfeld's case, 
however, this example demonstrates the lengths to which Rubenfeld must stretch the notions 
of "establishment" and "disestablishment" to give his principle any modern relevance. On its 
face this hypothetical has nothing whatsoever to do with the kinds of formal state establish­
ments, or with the disestablishing laws, he says the Founders were worried about. What is 
more, the hypothetical law - forcing religious observance on unconsenting adults - is an­
other blatant violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The hypothetical starkly reveals antidis­
establishmentarianism for what it is: a useless First Amendment appendage, which at best 
gets in the way of other First Amendment principles that actually perform substantive 
functions. 
37. See id. at 2374 ("Did RFRA "enforce" free exercise rights within the meaning of 
section 5? That question, interesting as it is, turns out to be irrelevant. Even if yesterday's 
RFRA or tomorrow's new and improved RFRA came within the terms of section 5, it would 
still violate the Establishment Clause and hence be unconstitutional."). 
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their (post-Fourteenth-Amendment) duty not to abridge the free 
exercise of religion. 
The question whether Congress properly exercised its Section 5 
powers in enacting RFRA, or might properly do so in the future in 
enacting a different law on the basis of different findings, is a ques­
tion that turns on the scope and limits of its Section 5 powers, as the 
Boerne Court recognized. It does not tum on an interpretation of 
the First Amendment beholden to anachronistic concerns about 
protecting official state churches. The First Amendment today is 
much more complicated, and much more important, than that. 
